A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect...
Presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts.
Preface1Introduction1IStrategic Games92Nash Equilibrium113Mixed, Correlated, and Evolutionary Equilibrium314Rationalizability and Iterated Elimination of Dominated Actions535Knowledge and Equilibrium67IIExtensive Games with Perfect Information876Extensive Games with Perfect Information897Bargaining Games1178Repeated Games1339Complexity Considerations in Repeated Games16310Implementation Theory177IIIExtensive Games with Imperfect Information19711Extensive Games with Imperfect Information19912Sequential Equilibrium219IVCoalitional Games25513The Core25714Stable Sets, the Bargaining Set, and the Shapley Value27715The Nash Solution299List of Results313References321Index341