Animal Minds: Beyond Cognition to Consciousness

\ Animal Minds\ \ \ \ Beyond Cognition to Consciousness\ \ \ \ By Donald R. Griffin\ \ \ University of Chicago Press\ \ \ Copyright © 2003\ \ \ University of Chicago\ All right reserved.\ \ ISBN: 0-226-30865-0\ \ \ \ \ \ Chapter One\ \ \ In Favor of Animal Consciousness\ A hungry chimpanzee walking through his native rain forest comes upon a\ large Panda oleosa nut lying on the ground under one of the widely\ scattered Panda trees. He knows that these nuts are much too hard to open\ with his hands or teeth and that although he can use pieces of wood or\ relatively soft rocks to batter open the more abundant Coula edulis nuts,\ these tough Panda nuts can only be cracked by pounding them with a very\ hard piece of rock. Very few stones are available in the rain forest, but\ he walks 80 meters straight to another tree where several days ago he had\ cracked open a Panda nut with a large chunk of granite. He carries this\ rock back to the nut he has just found, places it in a crotch between two\ buttress roots, and cracks it open with a few well-aimed blows. (The loud\ noises of chimpanzees cracking nuts with rocks had led early European\ explorers to suspect that some unknown native tribe was forging metal\ tools in the depths of the rain forest.)\ In a city park in Japan, a hungry green-backed heron picks up atwig,\ breaks it into small pieces, and carries one of these to the edge of a\ pond, where she drops it into the water. At first it drifts away, but she\ picks it up and brings it back. She watches the floating twig intently\ until small minnows swim up to it, and she then seizes one by a rapid\ thrusting grab with her long, sharp bill. Another green-backed heron from\ the same colony carries bits of material to a branch extending out over\ the pond and tosses the bait into the water below. When minnows approach\ this bait, he flies down and seizes one on the wing.\ Must we reject, or repress, any suggestion that the chimpanzees or the\ herons think consciously about the tasty food they manage to obtain by\ these coordinated actions? Many animals adapt their behavior to the\ challenges they face either under natural conditions or in laboratory\ experiments. This has persuaded many scientists that some sort of\ cognition must be required to orchestrate such versatile behavior. For\ example, in other parts of Africa chimpanzees select suitable branches\ from which they break off twigs to produce a slender probe, which they\ carry some distance to poke it into a termite nest and eat the termites\ clinging to it as it is withdrawn. Apes have also learned to use\ artificial communication systems to ask for objects and activities they\ want and to answer simple questions about pictures of familiar things.\ Vervet monkeys employ different alarm calls to inform their companions\ about particular types of predator.\ Such ingenuity is not limited to primates. Lionesses sometimes cooperate\ in surrounding prey or drive prey toward a companion waiting in a\ concealed position. Captive beaver have modified their customary patterns\ of lodge- and dam-building behavior by piling material around a vertical\ pole at the top of which was located food that they could not otherwise\ reach. They are also very ingenious at plugging water leaks, sometimes\ cutting pieces of wood to fit a particular hole through which water is\ escaping. Under natural conditions, in late winter some beaver cut holes\ in the dams they have previously constructed, causing the water level to\ drop, which allows them to swim about under the ice without holding their\ breath.\ Nor is appropriate adaptation of complex behavior to changing\ circumstances a mammalian monopoly. Bowerbirds construct and decorate\ bowers that help them attract females for mating. Plovers carry out\ injury-simulating distraction displays that lead predators away from their\ eggs or young, and they adjust these displays according to the intruder's\ behavior. A parrot uses imitations of spoken English words to ask for\ things he wants to play with and to answer simple questions such as\ whether two objects are the same or different, or whether they differ in\ shape or color. Even certain insects, specifically the honeybees, employ\ symbolic gestures to communicate the direction and distance their sisters\ must fly to reach food or other things that are important to the colony.\ These are only a few of the more striking examples of versatile behavior\ on the part of animals that will be discussed in the following pages.\ Although these are not routine everyday occurrences, the fact that animals\ are capable of such versatility has led to a subtle shift on the part of\ some scientists concerned with animal behavior. Rather than insisting that\ animals do not think at all, many scientists now believe that they\ sometimes experience at least simple thoughts, although these thoughts are\ probably different from any of ours. For example, Terrace (1987, 135)\ closed a discussion of "thoughts without words" as follows: "Now that\ there are strong grounds to dispute Descartes' contention that animals\ lack the ability to think, we have to ask just how animals do think."\ Because so many cognitive processes are now believed to occur in animal\ brains, it is more and more difficult to cling to the conviction that this\ cognition is never accompanied by conscious thoughts.\ Conscious thinking may well be a core function of central nervous systems.\ For conscious animals enjoy the advantage of being able to think about\ alternative actions and select behavior they believe will get them what\ they want or help them avoid what they dislike or fear. Of course, human\ consciousness is astronomically more complex and versatile than any\ conceivable animal thinking, but the basic question addressed in this book\ is whether the difference is qualitative and absolute or whether animals\ are conscious even though the content of their consciousness is\ undoubtedly limited and very likely quite different from ours. There is of\ course no reason to suppose that any animal is always conscious of\ everything it is doing, for we are entirely unaware of many complex\ activities of our bodies. Consciousness may occur only rarely in some\ species and not at all in others, and even animals that are sometimes\ aware of events that are important in their lives may be incapable of\ understanding many other facts and relationships. But the capability of\ conscious awareness under some conditions may well be so essential that it\ is the sine qua non of animal life, even for the smallest and simplest\ animals that have any central nervous system at all. When the whole system\ is small, this core function may therefore be a larger fraction of the\ whole.\ The fact that we are consciously aware of only a small fraction of what\ goes on in our brains has led many scientists to conclude that\ consciousness is an epiphenomenon or trivial by-product of neural\ functioning, as discussed by Harnad (1982). But the component of central\ nervous system activity of which we are consciously aware is of special\ significance, because it is what makes life real and important to us, as\ discussed in detail by Siewert (1998). Insofar as other species are\ conscious, the same importance may well be manifest. Animals may carry out\ much of their behavior quite unconsciously. Many may never be conscious at\ all. But insofar as they are conscious, this is an important attribute.\ Although nonconscious information processing could in theory produce the\ same end result as conscious thinking, as emphasized by Shettleworth\ (1998) and others, it seems likely that conscious thinking and emotional\ feeling about current, past, and anticipated events is the best way to\ cope with some of the more critical challenges faced by animals in their\ natural lives. As pointed out by the philosopher Karl Popper (1978), what\ he termed "mental powers" are very effective in coping with novel and\ unpredictable challenges. This is especially true of many animals under\ natural conditions, where mistakes are often fatal. The effectiveness of\ conscious thinking and guiding behavioral choices on the basis of\ emotional feelings about what is liked or disliked may well be so great\ that this core function is one of the most important activities of which\ central nervous systems are capable.\ The nature of animal minds was a major subject of investigation until it\ was repressed by behaviorism, as discussed in chapter 2. Darwin, Romanes,\ Lloyd Morgan, von Uexkull, and many other scientists of the nineteenth and\ early twentieth centuries were deeply interested in animal mentality. This\ history has been thoroughly reviewed by Schultz (1975), Wasserman (1981),\ Boakes (1984), Dewsbury (1984), and R. J. Richards (1987), and especially\ cogently by Burghardt (1985a, 1985b). What is new is the accumulated\ results of a century of active and successful investigation of animal\ behavior. These discoveries have now provided a wealth of data about the\ complexities and versatility of animal behavior under natural conditions,\ and what they can learn to do in the laboratory. We can therefore return\ to the investigation of animal minds with far better and more extensive\ evidence than what was available to nineteenth-century biologists.\ I will take it for granted that behavior and consciousness (human and\ nonhuman) result entirely from events that occur in their central nervous\ systems. In other words, I will proceed on the basis of emergent\ materialism as analyzed by Bunge (1980, 6), Bunge and Ardilla (1987, 27),\ and Mahner and Bunge (1997, 205-12), and assume that subjective\ consciousness is an activity of central nervous systems, which are of\ course part of the physical universe. Just what sort of neural activity\ leads to consciousness remains a challenging mystery, as I will discuss in\ detail in chapter 8. But there is no need to call upon immaterial,\ vitalistic, or supernatural processes to explain how some fraction of\ human or animal brain activity results in conscious, subjective thoughts\ and feelings.\ \ Defining Consciousness\ No one seriously denies that we experience conscious thoughts and\ subjective feelings, even though we cannot describe them with complete\ accuracy and therefore no one else can experience them exactly as we do.\ The question under consideration in this book is the extent to which\ nonhuman animals also experience something of the same general nature as\ the subjective feelings and conscious thoughts that we know at first hand.\ The content of an animal's conscious experience may be quite different\ from any human experience. It may ordinarily be limited to what the animal\ perceives at the moment about its immediate situation, but sometimes its\ awareness probably includes memories of past perceptions or anticipations\ of future events. An animal's understanding may be accurate or misleading,\ and the content of its thoughts may be simple or complex. A conscious\ animal must often experience some feeling about whatever engages its\ attention. Furthermore, any thinking animal is likely to guide its\ behavior at least partly on the basis of the content of its thoughts,\ however simple or limited these may be.\ In their Dictionary of Ethology Immelmann and Beer (1989) define animal\ consciousness as "immediate awareness of things, events, and relations,"\ but they hasten to add the conventional behavioristic claim that\ "statements about the nature of this awareness in comparison to that of\ humans are dismissed by tough-minded scientists as idle speculation." But\ speculation is where scientific investigation often begins, and I hope to\ stimulate new and enterprising inquiries that will significantly reduce\ our current ignorance. Consciousness is not a neat homogeneous entity;\ there are obviously many kinds and degrees of consciousness. Many\ scientists (for example, Hauser 2000, xiii) feel that terms such as\ consciousness are too vague and slippery to be useful in scientific\ investigation, and they are very reluctant even to begin talking about the\ possibility of nonhuman consciousness without first settling on clear-cut\ definitions. On the other hand, Francis Crick (1994, 20) is not so easily\ inhibited:\ Everyone has a rough idea of what is meant by consciousness. It is\ better to avoid a precise definition of consciousness because of the\ dangers of premature definitions. Until the problem is understood much\ better, any attempt at a formal definition is likely to be either\ misleading or overly restrictive or both. If this seems like cheating,\ try defining for me the word gene. So much is now known about genes that\ any simple definition is likely to be inadequate. How much more\ difficult, then, to define a biological term when rather little is known\ about it.\ \ Semantic Piracy\ An unnecessary confusion has arisen concerning the meanings attached to\ terms such as awareness, emotion, mind, and conscious. In ordinary usage\ they denote conscious mental states, but many scientists justify their\ aversion to these terms and the concepts they designate by arguing that\ they cannot be defined with the precision necessary for scientific\ analysis. This has led to a sort of semantic piracy committed by defining\ mental states in essentially behavioristic terms. Such terms as positive\ or negative emotion replace like or fear when a living or even a nonliving\ system is more likely to respond in one way than another, ruling out\ implicitly by choice of terms subjective experiences such as liking or\ fearing. Crist (1996, 1998, 1999) has lucidly analyzed the pervasive\ effect of this "mechanomorphic" terminology. Thinking is often redefined\ explicitly or implicitly as information processing. Calling it cognition\ has become a popular way to study animal mentality without recognizing\ that at least some of the cognition is probably accompanied, and\ influenced, by conscious subjective experiences.\ \ The Content of Animal Consciousness\ Animal thoughts and emotions presumably concern matters of immediate\ importance to the animals themselves, rather than kinds of conscious\ thinking that are primarily relevant to human affairs. Consciousness is\ not an all-or-nothing attribute. It varies widely within our species, and\ it would be remarkable if the content of every animal's consciousness were\ identical. Conscious thinking and strong emotional feelings can ordinarily\ deal with only one or a very few things at a time. Large, complex animals\ must also be able to organize and retain information about innumerable\ perceptions and potential actions of which only one or a very few can be\ the focus of conscious awareness at any one moment.\ Recognizing that an animal's consciousness may be quite different from any\ human thoughts and feelings makes the problem of identifying and analyzing\ it more difficult. We may, however, tend to exaggerate this difficulty,\ because many basic concerns are likely to be very similar for most animals\ that have any conscious experiences at all.\ \ Continues...\ \ \ \ \ \ \ Excerpted from Animal Minds\ by Donald R. Griffin\ Copyright © 2003\ by University of Chicago.\ Excerpted by permission.\ All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.\ Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.\ \ \

Preface1In Favor of Animal Consciousness12Objections and Their Limitations203Finding Food374Predation625Construction of Artifacts806Tools and Special Devices1137Categories and Concepts1278Physiological Indices of Thinking1489Communication as Evidence of Thinking16410Symbolic Communication18711Deception and Manipulation21212Dolphins and Apes22813The Philosophical and Ethical Significance of Animal Consciousness25214The Scientific Significance of Animal Consciousness270Bibliography287Index333

\ BooknewsIn this updated edition, a pioneering cognitive ethologist (Museum of Comparative Zoology, Harvard U.) draws on recent research on animal communication as windows into the mentality of various species, and considers the philosophical-ethical implications of animal consciousness. Includes a whale of a bibliography. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)\ \