Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology
The authors of Austere Realism describe and defend a provocative ontological-cum-semantic position, asserting that the right ontology is minimal or austere, in that it excludes numerous common-sense posits, and that statements employing such posits are nonetheless true, when truth is understood to be semantic correctness under contextually operative semantic standards. Terence Horgan and Matjaz [hacek over z] Potrc [hacek over c] argue that austere realism emerges naturally from consideration...
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A provocative ontological-cum-semantic position asserting that the right ontology is austere in its exclusion of numerous common-sense and scientific posits and that many statements employing such posits are nonetheless true.
Introduction 11 Simple Realism: The Naive Approach to Truth and Ontology 72 Problems for Simple Realism 153 Contextual Semantics: Truth as Indirect Correspondence 334 Austere Realism: Overcoming Simple Realism's Problems 695 The Ascendance of the Austere: Further Arguments for Austere Realism 916 Objections to Austere Realism 1197 Betting on the Blobject: The Choice among Austere Ontologies 161Notes 193References 207Index 215
