Conquest in Cyberspace: National Security and Information Warfare
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This book shows the risks and protections cyberspace offers for national security and information warfare.
List of Figures xAcknowledgments xiIntroduction 1What Does Conquest Mean in Cyberspace? 4Precis 10Hostile Conquest as Information Warfare 15An Ideal-Type Definition of Information Warfare 16Control at One Layer Is Not Control at Another 24Applying the Ideal-Type Definition 27There Is No Forced Entry in Cyberspace 31Information Warfare Only Looks Strategic 37IW Strategy and Terrorism 43Conclusions 49Information Warfare as Noise 50Disinformation and Misinformation 51Defenses against Noise 55Redundancy 55Filtration 57What Tolerance for Noise? 59Tolerance in Real Environments 60Castles and Agoras 62Hopping from Agoras to Castles? 64Castling Foes 66Concluding Observations 71Can Information Warfare Be Strategic? 73Getting In 75Mucking Around 79Spying 79Denial of Service 80Corruption 81Distraction 83Countermeasures 84Redundancy 84Learning 85Damage Assessment 87Prediction 90Intelligence Is Necessary 90Intelligence Alone Is Hardly Sufficient 93Is Information Warfare Ready for War? 95The Paradox of Control 96Other Weaponization Criteria 97Conclusions 100Information Warfare against Command and Control 102The Sources of Information Overload 103Its Effect on Conventional Information Warfare Techniques 105Coping Strategies 107Who Makes Decisions in a Hierarchy? 107Responses to Information Overload 111Know the Enemy's Information Architecture 116Elements of Information Culture 117Elements of Nodal Architecture 118Injecting Information into Adversary Decision Making 118Ping, Echo, Flood, and Sag 121Ping and Echo 121Flood and Sag 122Conclusions 124Friendly Conquest in Cyberspace 125A Redefinition of Conquest 126The Mechanisms of Coalitions 128The Particular Benefits of Coalitions 130Information and Coalitions 131The Cost of Coalitions in Cyberspace 136Enterprise Architectures and Influence 142Alliances with Individuals 148The Special Case of Cell Phones 151Alliances of Organizations 155Ecologies of Technological Development 155DoD's Global Information Grid (GIG) 159Merging the Infrastructures of Allies 164Conclusions 166Friendly Conquest Using Global Systems 169Geospatial Data 170Coping with Commercial Satellites 175Manipulation through Cyberspace 178Getting Others to Play the Game 180Some Conclusions about Geospatial Services 182National Identity Systems 182Two Rationales for a National Identity System 183Potential Parameters for a Notional System 184Constraints from and Influences over Foreign Systems 187Compare, Contrast, and Conclude 191Retail Conquest in Cyberspace 193Information Trunks and Leaves 194Where Does Cheap Information Come From? 195Surveillance in Cyberspace 198Making Information Global 203Privacy 204Amalgamating Private Information 206Using the Information 208General Coercion 208Specific Coercion 209Persuasion 211Some Limits of Retail Warfare in Cyberspace 214Using Retail Channels to Measure Wholesale Campaigns 215Conclusions 218From Intimacy, Vulnerability 220Do the Walls Really Come Down? 220Intimacy as a Target 222The Fecklessness of Friends 225Betrayal 228Conclusions 230Talking Conquest in Cyberspace 231Four Layers of Communications 232Human Conversation in Layers 232Cyberspace in Layers 236Complexity Facilitates Conquest 240Complexity and Hostile Conquest 241Complexity and Friendly Conquest 242Semantics 245Pragmatics 249Lessons? 255Managing Conquest in Cyberspace 256Conducting Hostile Conquest in Cyberspace 257Warding Off Hostile Conquest in Cyberspace 262Byte Bullies 262Headless Horsemen 265Perfect Prevention 268Total Transparency 270Nasty Neighborhoods 272Exploiting Unwarranted Influence 276Against Unwarranted Influence 281In Microsoft's Shadow 282Microsoft and Computer Security 285Conclusions 289Why Cyberspace Is Likely to Gain Consequence 291More Powerful Hardware and Thus More Complex Software 292Cyberspace in More Places 294Fuzzier Borders between Systems 297Accepted Cryptography 299Privatized Trust 301The Possible Substitution of Artificial for Natural Intelligence 303Conclusions 306Index 307
