Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis: Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Study Institute on Long Island, NY, U. S. A., July 1-12, 1991
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This book presents the first systematic exposition of the use of game-theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Rather than focusing on single concepts it covers all basic equivalence theorems — core, bargaining set, Shapley and Harsanyi value, Nash equilibria — including an axiomatic approach to them. It treats thoroughly the value of large games, and the new tools used in the strategic approach to general equilibrium. The different chapters are written by leaders of their respective fields. The book is primarily addressed to researchers and advanced graduate students, but being largely self-contained, it can also be used as a text for a course.
List of Figures7List of Authors9Introduction11IGeneral Equilibrium and Cooperative Games: Basic Results17IICore Convergence in Perfectly Competitive Economies35IIIEconomies with Atoms47IVBargaining Sets51VThe Shapley Value61VIValue of Games with a Continuum of Players67VIIThe TU Value: The Non-differentiable Case81Addendum: The Shapley value of a perfectly competitive market may not exist95VIIIThe Harsanyi Value105IXValue Equivalence Theorems: The TU and NTU Cases113XEconomic Applications of the Shapley Value121XIAn Axiomatic Approach to the Equivalence Phenomenon137XIILarge Games and Economies with Effective Small Groups145XIIIStrategic Market Games: a Survey of Some Results209XIVFrom Nash to Walras Equilibrium225XVCorrelated- and Communication Equilibria243XVINotes on Correlated Equilibrium and Sunspot Equilibrium249XVIIImplementation with Plain Conversation261
