Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions: Doing it Right
Little over a decade ago, infrastructure concessions promised to solve Latin America's endemic infrastructure deficit. Awarded in competitive auctions, these concessions were supposed to combine private sector efficiency with rent dissipation brought about by competition. Yet something did not go quite right, as concessions were plagued with opportunistic renegotiations, most of them at the expense of taxpayers.\ Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions is a major contribution...
Search in google:
This book culls lessons on the design and implementation of concession contracts from some 1,000 examples and assesses what these lessons mean for future practice. Examples are taken from Latin America where, during the 1990s, governments awarded contracts to the private sector to operate public utilities. The study shows the extent to which the concession award process, contract design, the regulatory framework, and the overall governance structure tend to drive the success of any reform effort and the likelihood of contract renegotiation. Author information is not given. Annotation ©2004 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
ForewordPrefaceAcknowledgments1Overview12Options for private participation in infrastructure233Concessions and the problem of renegotiation334Anecdotal evidence of the drivers of renegotiation435Renegotiation in theory and practice716Confirming anecdote and theory : empirical analysis of the determinants of renegotiation797Policy implications and lessons : guidelines for optimal concession design958Conclusion141App. 1Data description149App. 2Choice and definition of independent variables157App. 3Econometric analysis : results of the probit estimations167References183Index191
