Models, Truth, and Realism
Barry Taylor's book mounts a major new argument against one of the fundamental tenets of much contemporary philosophy, the idea that we can make sense of reality as existing objectively, independently of our capacities to come to know it. He concludes that there is no defensible notion of truth which preserves the theses of traditional realism, nor any extant position sufficiently true to the ideals of that doctrine to inherit its title. In presenting his case Taylor engages with many key...
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Barry Taylor's book mounts a major new argument against one of the fundamental tenets of much contemporary philosophy, the idea that we can make sense of reality as existing objectively, independently of our capacities to come to know it. He concludes that there is no defensible notion of truth which preserves the theses of traditional realism, nor any extant position sufficiently true to the ideals of that doctrine to inherit its title. In presenting his case Taylor engages with many key works of contemporary metaphysics, semantics, and philosophical logic, so his book will be of interest to a broad spectrum of scholars and students.
Overview : the argument of this book1IThe explication of realism1Realism and objective truth132Realism explicated32IIModel theory and correspondence3Putnam's model-theoretic arguments494Changing the rules855The status of natural properties101IIIRealism without correspondence?6Taking the hierarchy seriously1277Formal theories of truth and Putnam's 'common-sense realism'1348Tarskian truth and the views of John McDowell148Coda : Brandom, compositionality, and singular terms166
