Political Game Theory: An Introduction
Political Game Theory, first published in 2007, is a self-contained introduction to game theory and its applications to political science. The book presents choice theory, social choice theory, static and dynamic games of complete information, static and dynamic games of incomplete information, repeated games, bargaining theory, mechanism design and a mathematical appendix covering, logic, real analysis, calculus and probability theory. The methods employed have many applications in various...
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Political Game Theory is a self-contained introduction to game theory and its applications to political science.
Acknowledgments xiiiIntroduction 1Organization of the Book 3The Theory of Choice 6Finite Sets of Actions and Outcomes 7Continuous Choice Spaces 11Utility Theory 18Utility Representations on Continuous Choice Spaces 20Spatial Preferences 21Exercises 25Choice Under Uncertainty 27The Finite Case 27Risk Preferences 38Learning 46Critiques of Expected Utility Theory 51Time Preferences 57Exercises 62Social Choice Theory 66The Open Search 66Preference Aggregation Rules 6Collective Choice 76Manipulation of Choice Functions 82Exercises 85Games in the Normal Form 87The Normal Form 89Solutions to Normal Form Games 93Application: The Hotelling Model of Political Competition 101Existence of Nash Equilibria 107Dominance and Mixed Strategies 113Calculating NashEquilibria 115Application: Interest Group Contributions 117Application: International Externalities 119Computing Equilibria with Constrained Optimization 121Proving the Existence of Nash Equilibria 123Comparative Statics 126Refining Nash Equilibria 138Application: Private Provision of Public Goods 140Exercises 145Bayesian Games in the Normal Form 150Formal Definitions 152Application: Trade Restrictions 154Application: Jury Voting 156Application: Jury Voting with a Continuum of Signals 159Application: Public Goods and Incomplete Information 161Application: Uncertainty About Candidate Preferences 164Application: Campaigns, Contests, and Auctions 166Existence of Bayesian Nash Equilibria 168Exercises 169Extensive Form Games 171Backward Induction 175Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information 177The Single-Deviation Principle 184A Digression on Subgame Perfection and Perfect Equilibria 185Application: Agenda Control 186Application: A Model of Power Transitions 192Application: A Model of Transitions to Democracy 193Application: A Model of Coalition Formation 197Exercises 201Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information 204Perfect Bayesian Equilibria 208Signaling Games 214Application: Entry Deterrence in Elections 219Application: Information and Legislative Organization 227Application: Informational Lobbying 232Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 236Exercises 248Repeated Games 251The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 252The Grim Trigger Equilibrium 253Tit-for-Tat Strategies 256Intermediate Punishment Strategies 258The Folk Theorem 260Application: Interethnic Cooperation 263Application: Trade Wars 269Exercises 273Bargaining Theory 275The Nash Bargaining Solution 275Noncooperative Bargaining 281Majority-Rule Bargaining Under a Closed Rule 286The Baron-Ferejohn Model Under Open Rule 291Bargaining with Incomplete Information 294Application: Veto Bargaining 296Application: Crisis Bargaining 307Exercises 318Mechanism Design and Agency Theory 320An Example 321The Mechanism Design Problem 323Application: Polling 326Auction Theory 328Application: Electoral Contests and All-Pay Auctions* 334Incentive Compatibility and Individual Rationality 339Constrained Mechanism Design 342Mechanism Design and Signaling Games 361Exercises 366Mathematical Appendix 369Mathematical Statements and Proofs 370Sets and Functions 372The Real Number System 376Points and Sets 378Continuity of Functions 380Correspondences 383Calculus 384Probability Theory 404Bibliography 417Index 423
\ From the Publisher"At last, a challenging but accessible graduate-level text for a serious course in game theory for political scientists. Teaching game theory in the context of political-science examples, this book will be the standard text for many years to come." Robert Powell, Berkeley\ \
