Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources
Explores ways that the tragedy of the commons can be avoided by people who use common-property resources.
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Explores ways that the tragedy of the commons can be avoided by people who use common-property resources
TablesFiguresCh. 1Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resource Problems3Ch. 2Institutional Analysis and Common-Pool Resources23Ch. 3Games Appropriators Play51Ch. 4Rules and Games75Ch. 5CPR Baseline Appropriation Experiments105Ch. 6Probabilistic Destruction of the CPR129Ch. 7Communication in the Commons145Ch. 8Sanctioning and Communication Institutions171Ch. 9Regularities from the Laboratory and Possible Explanations195Ch. 10Institutions and Performance in Irrigation Systems225Ch. 11Fishers' Institutional Responses to Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas247Ch. 12Rules, Rule Making, and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit between Rule Systems and Resource UseCh. 13Changing Rules, Changing Games: Evidence from Groundwater Systems in Southern California283Ch. 14Regularities from the Field and Possible Explanations301Ch. 15Cooperation and Social Capital319Bibliography331Contributors361Index363
