Schroeder's Antiques Price Guide, 2011, 29th Edition
For almost 30 years, Schroeder's Antiques Price Guide has been our #1 bestselling title. The reasons for its success are simple: annually, 300 different advisors, each an expert in their field(s), carefully review each category for accuracy, supply new listings, and provide all-new color photographs for their subjects; and more than 700 categories accompanied by representative listings, photos, and brief histories about each subject are included. This 29th edition boasts a revised directory...
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For almost 30 years, Schroeder's Antiques Price Guide has been our #1 bestselling title. The reasons for its success are simple: annually, 300 different advisors, each an expert in their field(s), carefully review each category for accuracy, supply new listings, and provide all-new color photographs for their subjects; and more than 700 categories accompanied by representative listings, photos, and brief histories about each subject are included. This 29th edition boasts a revised directory that accommodates the recent shift from traditional print catalogs to online auction catalogs and auction websites that now post results strictly on the internet. And as always, a complete directory of advisors is provided in the back of the book so that readers may contact our experts directly for advice. Several new categories have been added to this edition, many in the glass field, including Atterbury & Company and Kanawha, and many sections have been expanded to feature more listings and additional historical company facts. We have also added several more people to our already diverse board of advisors, who see to it that only the most accurate data remains. It's no wonder that Schroeder's is still the most reliable source for dealers and collectors across the nation, for the lowest price you'll find for such a massive reference on antiques.
AcknowledgementsIntroduction 11 Philosophical Problems for International Lawyers 9Conceptions of International Law in Space and Time 11Scepticism in the Philosophy of International Law 16Theory and Practice 18Conclusion 202 The Methodological Problem 23The Methodological Problem in Legal Science 25The Methodological Problem 25Is International Law Racist? 27The Ontological Problem 33Conceptual Analysis and Focal Analysis 39Conceptual Analysis 40Focal Analysis 43Conceptual Analysis, Focal Analysis and the Raw Data 45The Legal Scientist 47Conclusion 493 The Conceptual Analysis of International Law 51Hart's The Concept of Law as a Form of Conceptual Analysis 52Legal Positivism 53Hart's Concept of Law 56Hart's Non-ambitious Concept of Law 57Hart's Ambitious Concept of Law 59International Law as an Indeterminate Form of Law 61Usages and Conventions 65The Legal Scientist, the Ordinary Language User and the Legal Official 65Law as a Social Practice 68Theoretical Values 69Law as a Conventional Practice 70Paradigm Cases and the Internal Point of View 74Conclusion 754 Focal Analysis and Ideal-Types 77Purposivity and International Law 80Human Dignity and the Purpose of International Law 80Normative Positivism and International Law 83Focal Analysis and Ideal-Types 84Action and Axiology 85Ideal-Types 86The Ideal-Type and Collective and Institutionalised Social Practices 88General Concepts 91Weber on International Law 93Ideal-Types and Practical Reasonableness 93The Concept of International Law Relies upon the General Concept of Law 94Purpose and Meaning 98Practical Reasonableness and Ideal-Types 101Components of the Concept of International Law 1025 Practical Reasonableness and Human Dignity 103The Idea of Human Dignity 106Human Dignity as Empowerment 108The Substantive Question 109Generic Features of Agency 112Distributive and Authoritative Questions 114The Authoritative Question 115Action and the Generic Features of Agency 117The Universalisation of Generic Rights 119The Distributive Question 121The Concept of International Law 122Dignity in the Kingdom of Ends 122From the Kingdom of Ends to Positive Law 123Conclusion 1256 The Logic of the Autonomy Thesis 127The Autonomy Thesis 130Structure of the Autonomy Thesis 131Hobbes' Version of the Autonomy Thesis 132Kant's Version of the Autonomy Thesis 136Oppenheim's Version of the Autonomy Thesis 139Weil's Version of the Autonomy Thesis 141Failure of the Autonomy Thesis 142Adjudication and Function 143Legitimacy as a General Condition for the Success of the Autonomy Thesis 145The Autonomy Thesis and International Law 146Public Practical Reasons 149Practical Reasonableness and the Law 151Conclusion 1547 Law as a General Concept 157The Bare-Autonomy Thesis and the Integrated-Autonomy Thesis 159Moral Reasoning and Law 161Ideal and Non-ideal Theory 162Justification of the Autonomy Thesis 164Immorality of the State of Nature 164Law as a Community Governed by an Omnilateral Will 168Kant's Justification for Law 169Enforcement 173Justification of the Integrated-Autonomy Thesis 175Law Constitutes our Freedom from Dependency 177Rousseau's Concept of Law 182The General Concept of Law 183Conclusion 1858 The Foundations of the International Legal Order 187A Justification for International Law 188Civil Incorporation and the Sovereign State 190The State and Civil Incorporation 191Sovereignty and Collateral Moral Rights 193The State and Agency 195International Legal Order 197Kant's áState of War' 197Why is the State of War Not-rightful? 199The Integrated-Autonomy Thesis and the Sovereignty of International Law 201Institutional Design 203International Legal Order as a Stuprastate System 204International Legal Order as an Interstate System 205Interstate or Suprastate Institutional Design? 208Conclusion 210Lauterpacht and the Progressive Interpretation of International Law 210Unanswered Questions 2129 The Discontinuity Thesis 215Alternatives to International Legal Order 218Sovereign States are Not Similar, in Relevant Ways, to Human Agents 218A Rejection of the Universal State, Not International Legal Order 220The Sovereign State Cannot be Considered an Agent 222Transgovernmental Law Instead of International Law? 226Rejection of International Legal Order 229Sovereign States are Not Similar, in Relevant Ways, to Human Beings 229Prudence and International Legal Order 230The Environment in which Sovereign States Find Themselves is Not Similar in Relevant Ways to the Environment in which Human Beings Find Themselves 232Are International Relations Not Unreasonable? 234Approximations to International Law 235Surrogates, Analogues and Approximations 237The Possibility of Perpetual Peace 239Conclusion 24110 International Legal Order in Ideal and Non-ideal Theory 243Ideal Theory 245Norm-Creation 246Custom 248Interpretation 250Enforcement 255Failure of Interstate Design for Ideal Theory 255Non-Ideal Theory 257Juridical and Moral Concepts of the State 258Institutional Architecture and Norm-Creation 265Enforcement 268Self-Defence 269The Concept of International Law and the Role of the International Lawyer 270Conclusion 273Bibliography 277Index 291
