Strategies and Games: Theory and Practice

Hardcover
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Author: Prajit K. Dutta

ISBN-10: 0262041693

ISBN-13: 9780262041690

Category: Economic Theory & Schools of Thought

Game theory has become increasingly popular among undergraduate as well as business school students. This text is the first to provide both a complete theoretical treatment of the subject and a variety of real-world applications, primarily in economics, but also in business,political science, and the law. Strategies and Games grew out of Prajit Dutta's experience teaching a course in game theory over the last six years at Columbia University.The book is divided into three parts: Strategic...

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Game theory has become increasingly popular among undergraduate as well as business school students. This text is the first to provide both a complete theoretical treatment of the subject and a variety of real-world applications, primarily in economics, but also in business,political science, and the law.

PrefaceA Reader's GuidePt. 1Introduction1Ch. 1A First Look at the Applications3Ch. 2A First Look at the Theory17Pt. 2Strategic Form Games: Theory and Practice33Ch. 3Strategic Form Games and Dominant Strategies35Ch. 4Dominance Solvability49Ch. 5Nash Equilibrium63Ch. 6An Application: Cournot Duopoly75Ch. 7An Application: The Commons Problem91Ch. 8Mixed Strategies103Ch. 9Two Applications: Natural Monopoly and Bankruptcy Law121Ch. 10Zero-Sum Games139Pt. 3Extensive Form Games: Theory and Applications155Ch. 11Extensive Form Games and Backward Induction157Ch. 12An Application: Research and Development179Ch. 13Subgame Perfect Equilibrium193Ch. 14Finitely Repeated Games209Ch. 15Infinitely Repeated Games227Ch. 16An Application: Competition and Collusion in the NASDAQ Stock Market243Ch. 17An Application: OPEC257Ch. 18Dynamic Games with an Application to the Commons Problem275Pt. 4Asymmetric Information Games: Theory and Applications291Ch. 19Moral Hazard and Incentives Theory293Ch. 20Games with Incomplete Information309Ch. 21An Application: Incomplete Information in a Cournot Duopoly331Ch. 22Mechanism Design, the Revelation Principle, and Sales to an Unknown Buyer349Ch. 23An Application: Auctions367Ch. 24Signaling Games and the Lemons Problem383Pt. 5Foundations401Ch. 25Calculus and Optimization403Ch. 26Probability and Expectation421Ch. 27Utility and Expected Utility433Ch. 28Existence of Nash Equilibria451Index465