The Libyan Paradox
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The militant attitude of the United States after 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 inspired the leadership of Libya to change its confrontational attitude towards America and Europe. The regime abandoned its development of nuclear weapons and opened its economy to the West. Nevertheless, Muammar Gaddafi, the leader of the Libyan Revolution, has found ways to consolidate his hold on the country. In this controversial book, Luis Martinez suggests that the future of Libya now lies in becoming, paradoxically, what he terms an "authoritarian liberal state."
Foreword Lisa Anderson viiMap xivIntroduction 1From the business of revolution to a revolution in business 1Libya: a model "conversion" of a rogue state? 4The price of rehabilitation 8The End of the Embargo 13The Jamahiriya: the reckoning 14"Halting the wheel that spins in a void" 19The dissolution of the government and the establishment of the Sha'biyat 22The social consequences of sanctions 24From Arab unity to racial discrimination 25Feelings of isolation and frustration 30The economics of plunder 31The "young revolutionaries" and the voyage to Malta: Rai music, sex, money and sport 35The emergence of new economic resources 37Conclusion 3911 September 2001: The "Conversion" of a Regime 43The impact of the ivasion of Iraq: fear of inclusion in the "axis of evil" 45The effort to resume normal relations with the United States 48The end of terrorist ambition 52Joining the coalition in the "Global War on Terrorism" 56The appearance of Islamist guerillas 60The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group 61The LIGFG's strategic deficit 68The regime's response to armed revolt: repression, decentralisation and liberalisation 70Conclusion 80Gaddafi: His Power and Position 85The bases of power 88The maintenance of authority 91Gaddafi's role: between the revolutionaries and the reformers 104The United States of Africa 107Libya and the Euro-Med partnership 111Conclusion 113Is the Jamahiriya Reformable? 117Libya: a Metiterranean Eldorado? 119Libyan blandishments 120The curse of oil? 124Necessary but impossible reforms 130The foreign policy uses of oil income 133The return of the American oil companies 134EPSA IV 136Strengthening relations with Europe 141The economic costs of Libya's revolutionary policy 144The end of the Algerian model of development 147Conclusion 150Conclusion: After Gaddafi? 153Notes 159Index 179
